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There is a widespread feeling that a substantial and increasing share of activities take place out-
side the official economy. This holds, in particular, for developing and transition but also for high
income economies. Such activities are unrecorded by the system of national income accounting,
which has become the accepted standard in all countries of the world.
The existence and increase of an underground economy gives rise to three major sets of concerns.
The economic and social conditions of individuals, household and countries are evaluated in a
biased way if one relies on the official statistics. Thus, the official number of unemployed per-
sons may hide that an (unknown) share of them actually work and receive wage income. As a
consequence, the macro economic policies are likely to be too expansionary and social policy too
excessive. A second concern is the loss of tax revenue as underground activities escape taxation.
A third concern interprets the underground economy as an indicator of an unhealthy state be-
tween citizens and government. The taxpayers are dissatisfied with what public services they get
for their contributions and seek to restress the balance by evading to the underground economy. It
is feared that such reaction makes government unable to finance the public goods necessary for
an economy and society. In contrast, opponents of government welcome such a development.
1. Denominations and Definitions
The phenomenon is known, and has been discussed in the literature, under many different names:
informal, unofficial, irregular, parallel second underground, subterranean, hidden, invisible, unre-2
corded and shadow economy or moonlighting. In several languages the term most often used is
black economy (le travail au noir, Schwarzarbeit, svarta sektor).
No single definition exists but it depends on the purpose. The most precise and predominantly
used definition seeks to relate the underground economy to officially measured national income:
It comprises all presently not recorded productive (i.e. value-adding) activities which should be in
the national product (GNP). This definition allows to compare and to add the underground econ-
omy to GNP.
This definition excludes two major activities:
(a) Production that by convention is not part of GNP, in particular private household activities.
The evaluation of its size has gendered a research area of its own. Depending on the approach
and measurement technique, the household sector comprises between 30% and 50% of GNP.
(b) Tax evasion is not value adding but redistributional and is therefore not included as such in
the above definition (e.g. when taxes on interest payments are evaded). However, in general,
no taxes are paid on underground activities (such as moonlighting for house building) which
are value-adding. Thus, underground activities and tax evasion are related but certainly not
identical. Tax evasion has also become a research area of its own. For the United States be-
tween 1973 and 1992 for example, it has been estimated that 17% of the taxes owned have
been evaded.
The underground economy should neither be identified with illegality. Some activities are per-
fectly legal but are not subject to taxes (e.g. because of their small size), and therefore escape
measurement in official statistics. Other activities are legal as such, but taxes are evaded. Finally,
on illegal activities (such as drug production and distribution) no taxes are paid.
Broader definitions of the informal and underground economy, depending on their purpose, in-
clude private household production and redistributional activities. In the following, the more nar-
row definition considering on unrecorded productive activities will be focussed on.
2. Measurement approaches
The major emphasis of economists has been to measure the size of the underground economy
relative to official GNP; its size compared to other countries and its development over time. The
other social sciences, especially sociology, have put more emphasis on the structure: who partici-3
pates where? The respective studies often provide highly detailed analyses of particular regions,
industries and types of underground activities.
In the 1980s and 90s, the quest to measure the size of the underground economy has led to inter-
esting methodological innovations, i.e. the challenge to “measure the invisible” has resulted in
new measurement methods.
Three general sets of measurement approaches may be distinguished:
2.1 Direct approaches
An obvious way to analyze the underground economy is to undertake surveys among (supposed)
suppliers and demanders of such services. This method allows to gather a detailed picture of the
structure of this sector. However, because a substantial part of these activities is illegal, the inter-
viewees may not be prepared to disclose their involvement. Somewhat surprisingly, research has
shown this is no serious problem. Typically, men are more involved than women, the young more
than the old, people without work more than employed ones, and the most prominent sectors are
construction and all kinds of services. In contrast, where substantial capital assets (which are
visible) are needed, less underground activity is observed.
A second direct approach is based on auditing of tax returns undertaken by tax collection and
social security administrations. A sample of tax payers is scrutinized in depth and under threats of
sanctions for failing collaboration. This approach provides detailed information on the strongest
evaders, in particular the self-employed who have better opportunities for concealment. Capital
income lends also easier to evasion than labor income. Tax audits have proved unable to reveal
all tax evasion, and are limited to taxable activities. As a large part of tax evasion is redistribu-
tional, that part is not relevant to the narrow definition of the underground economy.
A disadvantage of the two direct methods (surveys and tax auditing) is that they lead only to
point estimates. Moreover, it is unlikely that they capture all „shadow“ activities, so they can be
seen as providing lower bound estimates. They are unable (at least at present) to provide esti-
mates of the development and growth of the shadow economy over a long period of time. They
have, however at least one considerable advantage - they can provide detailed information about
shadow economy activities and the structure and composition of those who work in the shadow
economy.4
2.2 Indirect or Discrepancy approaches
The underground economy is reflected in discrepancies showing in various markets.
Persons working in the unofficial sector are able to spend more than their officially recorded in-
come. The discrepancy between the two may be observed at the level of individual households as
well as in the aggregate national accounts. This approach is questionable as this expenditure-
income discrepancy may either be due to measurement errors (which is indeed often the case) or
to reasons unrelated with the underground economy (e.g. the use of credits or reductions in
wealth).
Another discrepancy may be observable in the labor market. A decline in official participation
rates, or a low participation rate compared to other countries, may be an indication of unofficial
work. But again, the discrepancy may be related to other factors. Moreover, this approach is un-
able to isolate those persons who are at the same time active in the official and the unofficial
economy (which is often the case).
A third discrepancy may be visible in the monetary market. The dominant approach starts from
the assumption that underground transactions are paid in cash in order to make detection more
unlikely. The size of the underground economy is reflected in the amount of cash used in a coun-
try beyond that used for official transactions. This approach is elegant and easily applicable be-
cause the amount of currency is well documented. The assumption that unofficial activities are
transacted in cash is, however, questionable. Empirical research suggests that between 20% and
30% of the unofficial activities are not paid in cash, i.e. either by payment in kind or via a bank.
This fact is especially bothersome for the currency demand approach when the share of cash
payments changes over time and differs between countries. A significant portion of some curren-
cies is held outside the country issuing it; thus the US dollar is widely used in South America and
Asia. Again, the discrepancy is influenced by many factors unrelated to the underground econ-
omy such as the use of credit cards. Finally, it is problematic to infer the size of the unofficial
sector from currency transactions because the velocity of cash circulation may differ between the
official and the unofficial sector. Some of the difficulties just mentioned have been successfully
addressed by more recent research.
1) In particular, instead of comparing the actual use of cash to
the one deemed necessary for the official economy, a cash demand function is empirically meas-
                                               
1) The use of credit cards and the amount of currencies outside a country have been taken into account in some stud-
ies, compare e.g. Schneider (1994) and Rogoff (1998).5
ured i.e. econometrically estimated. This allows to control for influences (such as changes in the
rate of interest or the increasing us of substitutes for cash) unrelated to the underground economy.
Moreover, the extra use of cash has been directly attributed to causal factors, most importantly to
an increase in the tax and social security burden. Figures for the size and development of the
shadow economy can be calculated by comparing the difference between the development of
currency when the direct and indirect tax burden and government regulations are held at its low-
est value, and the development of currency with the current (much higher) burden of taxation and
government regulations. The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used ap-
proaches. It has been applied to 17 OECD countries. The latest developed discrepancy approach
looks at physical inputs, in particular the use of electricity. It is calculated how much electricity
would normally be used to produce the official national income. The excess use can be attributed
to the underground economy. This approach has again the great advantage of relying on easily
available data, which is a distinct advantage for developing and transition economies. However,
not all underground activities use much or even any electricity, and the relationship between pro-
duction and electricity used may change over time, or differ between countries, due to substitu-
tion and technical progress.
A general problem of all discrepancy approaches is that one has to assume a base year without
underground economy. Only then it is possible to attribute the existence and rise of a discrepancy
to the underground economy.
2.3 The Model approach
This method focuses on the causes and effects of the underground economy. By constructing a
model, it seeks to identify the unobserved sector in-between.
Three sets of factors are taken to be the main motivators of whether to engage in the unofficial
economy:
(i) Incentives to exit the official economy are the burden of taxation and of social security
contributions, as well as government regulations. The latter hinder or even prohibit activi-
ties in the official economy (e.g. because of a lack in work permit, especially for foreign-
ers) which provides an incentive to undertake them unofficially. This holds, of course,
also for illegal activities such as the production and distribution of drugs. An important
reason to exit the official sector are the restrictions imposed on working time. Low work6
hours, long holidays, early retirement, and above all unemployment are important reasons
for moonlighting.
(ii) Disincentives to be active in the underground economy are the expected punishment of
doing so. It is composed of the probability to be caught and the size of punishment. For
persons outside the established society (for example for illegal immigrants), or being self-
employed, expected punishment is lower than for other persons, and therefore a higher
rate of participation in the underground sector is likely.
(iii) Another disincentive to be active in the underground economy is the moral costs entailed.
A good citizen has moral qualms to undertake a forbidden activity. These moral costs are
closely related to “tax morale” which motivates citizens to pay their dues to the state.
The effects of the underground economy are reflected in the traces visible in the labor, money
and product markets discussed above. A specific econometric technique called “unobservable
variables” allows to estimate the size of the underground economy lying between the causes and
effects. This approach is the most comprehensive and builds on a well-structured behavioral
model but it requires a large amount of data. As these are often not available (in particular not for
developing and transition economies) this approach is not generally applicable. The estimation
technique moreover tends not to be statistically robust (i.e. small changes in specification and
values of variables strongly affects the estimates).
3. Empirical estimates
The following tables serve to indicate approximate magnitudes of the size and development of
the underground economy, defined as productive activities, i.e. using the narrow definition. Table
1 prevents a rough comparison of the size of the underground economies relative to GNP for a
selection of Western European countries, Japan and the United States for the mid 1990s, using




The South European countries (Greece, Italy) have an underground economy almost one third as
large as the officially measured GNP: followed by Spain, Portugal and Belgium having a shadow
economy between 20-24 % (of official) GNP. According to these estimates, the Scandinavian7
countries also have a sizeable unofficial economy (between 18-20 % of GNP), which is attributed
mainly to the high fiscal burden. The “central” European countries (Ireland, the Netherlands,
France, Germany and Great Britain) have a smaller underground economy (between 13-16 % of
GNP) probably due to a lower fiscal burden and moderate regulatory restrictions. The lower un-
derground economies are estimated to exist in countries with relatively low public sectors (Japan,
the United States and Switzerland), and comparatively high tax morale (United States, Switzer-
land).
Table 2 provides a rough comparison of the size of the underground economy relative to official
GNP for a selection of developing and transition economies for the beginning of the 1990s, using
the physical input (electricity) demand approach. Some of these countries (Nigeria, Egypt, Thai-
land) are estimated to have an underground sector nearly three quarters the size of officially re-
corded GNP. In many countries the size is one quarter to one third of GNP. In Asian countries
with a comparatively low public sector, high tax morale or high expected punishment (Hong





Transition economies are estimated to often have substantial unofficial activities, many around
one quarter of GNP. An exception is ex-Czechoslovakia where according to these estimates the
underground sector is clearly around ten percent of GNP.
Table 3 reports estimates of the growth of the underground economy (relative to GNP) for se-




The Scandinavian (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) and the German speaking countries (Germany,
Austria) exhibit a sizeable increase of the underground economy within the 35 years (1960-1995)
covered. But also the countries with a low share in the beginning (Switzerland, the United States)
show a significant increase, for the U.S. the share more than doubled. Sizeable increases have
been estimated, with few exceptions, for all types of countries and all kinds of approaches: the8
increasing importance of the underground relative to the official economy is a robust phenome-
non.
4. The Effects of the Shadow Economy on the Official Economy
In order to study the effects of the shadow economy on the official one, several authors integrate
underground economies into macro economic models
2); these researchers develop a macro model
of the business cycle as well as tax and monetary policy linkages with the shadow economy.
They conclude from their investigation of the growth of the shadow economy that on the one side
its effect should be taken into account in setting tax and regulatory policies and one the other side
that the presence of a shadow economy could lead to an overstatement (understatement) of the
inflationary (unemployment) effects of fiscal or monetary stimulus. Adam and Ginsburgh (1985)
focus on the implications of the shadow economy on "official" growth in their study for Belgium.
They find a positive relationship between the growth of the shadow economy and the "official"
one and under certain assumptions (i.e. very low entry costs into the shadow economy due to a
low probability of enforcement) they conclude that an expansionary fiscal policy has a positive
stimulus for both the formal and informal economies. A study for the United States argues that
the U. S. productivity slowdown over the period 1970 to 1989 was vastly overstated, as the un-
derreporting of income due to the more rapid growth of the U. S. shadow economy during this
period was not taken into account.
The underground economy can be beneficiary in that sense that it responds to the economic envi-
ronment's demand for urban services and small-scale manufacturing. From this point of view the
informal sector provides the economy with dynamic and entrepreneurial spirit and can lead to
more competition, higher efficiency and strong boundaries and limits for government activities.
The informal sector may offer contributions to the creation of markets, increase financial re-
sources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform the legal, social, and economic institutions nec-
essary for accumulation. The voluntary self-selection between formal and informal sector, as de-
scribed above, may provide a higher potential for economic growth and, hence, a positive corre-
lation between an increase of the informal sector and economic growth. Also some more addi-
tional positive „side effects“ of shadow economy activities must be considered: Empirical find-
                                               
2) For Austria this was done by Schneider, Hofreither, and Neck (1989), for Belgium by Adam and Ginsburgh (1985)
and for the U.S. by Fichtenbaum (1989).9
ings of Schneider (1999) show clearly that over 66 % of the earnings in the shadow economy are
rather immediately spent in the official sector in Germany and Austria and provide a considerable
boost for the official economy; hence the positive effects of these expenditures for economic
growth and for (mostly indirect) tax revenues must be taken into account as well. Evidence for
the U.K. shows that the hidden economy has a significant stimulative effect on the consumer ex-
penditure.
5. Policy Consequences
The growth of the underground economy over the last decades and its effect on the official econ-
omy both in general perception and scholarly research has prevailingly been evaluated as a nega-
tive development which should be counteracted. In particular, politicians and public officials
have pointed out that the state’s capacity to provide the desired public services is undermined.
But not all commentators share this view. Some see it as a welcome and effective limit on gov-
ernments’ tendency to continually raise the fiscal burden, and to impose more and more restric-
tions on the economy and society. It has also been argued that many developing and transition
economies would break down or function at a much lower level of production and welfare if the
underground economy did not exist. As has just been argued in section 4, too, unofficial activities
are seen as a desirable addition to the official economy whose productivity is strongly reduced by
excessive taxation and bureaucratic restrictions. A less pronounced evaluation points out that the
rise of the underground economy indicates that the relationship between the state and the citizens
is fragile and needs improvement.
The fight against the underground economy is a recurrent theme in many countries. The dominant
method is to increase deterrence. The probability of being caught is raised by more regular and
intensive controls, often by the police. Punishment is raised by imposing higher fines and, in se-
vere cases, prison sentences. The target are both buyers and suppliers of goods and services pro-
duced in the underground sector.
The success of such deterrence policies is rather uncertain. In the case of the underground sector
related to drug, prostitution and alcohol prohibition the effect has turned out to be at best weak, if
not counterproductive. Many persons active in the underground economy move more deeply into
illegality in order to make detection more difficult. As a result, the underground activities become10
more criminalized, and more difficult to observe and to influence. Well organized and ruthless
organized crime (often called the Mafia) becomes more dominant.
A deterrence policy needs not always be a failure but the successes tend to be short run. Provided
the demand for underground goods and services remains intact, the profit opportunities in the
underground economy become so large that supply reappears and the underground economy re-
couperates. A less oppressive policy is to lure people into the official economy by legalizing parts
of the underground economy, and by facilitating the more into the official economy (e.g. by
granting an amnesty). Such measures have proved to be only moderately successful.
A positive approach to raise the motivation to stay in the official economy by improving the effi-
ciency of public services, reducing the tax and social security burden imposed on labor and/or by
raising civic virtue has been used only rarely. Many policy makers doubt whether such measures
work at all. In any case, they are effective only in the longer run. One possibility is to adjust pub-
lic supply more closely to what the citizens desire, and to lower cost for a given quantity and
quality of public supply. This can be attempted by streamlining public sector activities (e.g. by
New Public Management). A more fundamental way is to improve the political process via
opening the political arena to contending interests, and strengthening the democratic participation






Bibliography               
Adam, M.C. and Ginsburgh, V. (1985). The effects of irregular markets on macroeconomic pol-
icy: Some estimates for Belgium, European Economic Review, 29/1 (March), pp.15-33.
Andreoni, J.; B. Erard and J. Feinstein (1998). Tax Compliance. Journal of Economic Literature
36: 818-860.
Cowell, Frank A. (1990). Cheating the Goverment. The Economics of Evasion. Cambridge, M.A.:
MIT Press.
De Soto, Hernando (1989). The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New
York: Harper and Row.
Feige, Edgar L. (ed.) (1989). The Underground Economies. Tax Evasion and Information Dis-
tortion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fichtenbaum, R. (1989). The productivity slowdown and the underground economy, Quarterly
Journal of Business and Economics, 28/3 (September), pp.78-90.
Frey, Bruno S. and Werner W. Pommerehne (1984). The Hidden Economy: State and Prospect
for Measurement. Review of Income and Wealth 30 (march): 1-23.
Gaertner, W. and A. Wenig (eds) (1985). The Economics of the  Shadow Economy. Berlin:
Springer.
Mars, G. (1994). Cheats at Work. An Anthropology of Workplace Crime. Brookfield: Dartmouth
Publ Co.
Pozo, S. (ed.) (1996). Exploring the Underground Economy: Studies of Illegal and Unreported
Activity. Kalamazaro: Upjohn.
Pyle, D. J. (1990). The Informal Economy. Utrecht.
Rogoff, K. (1998). Blessing or Curse? Foreign and underground demand for the euro notes,
Economic policy: The European Forum 26 (July), pp.261-304.
Schneider, F. (1999). Der Sozialstaat zwischen Markt und Hedeonismus?, in: Lamnek, S. und
Luedtke, J. (Hrsg.), Otto-von-Freising-Tagungen der Katholischen Universität Eichstätt, Leske
+ Budrich, Opladen 1999.12
Schneider, F. and Enste, D. (1998). Increasing Shadow Economics All Over the World - Fiction
or Reality? Working Paper 9819, Institute of Economics, University of Linz.
Schneider, F. (1994). Can the shadow economy be reduced through major tax reforms? An em-
pirical investigation for Austria, Supplement to Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49
(March), pp.137.152.
Schneider, F., Hofreither, M.F. and Neck, R. (1989). The consequences of a changing shadow
economy for the official economy: Some empirical results for Austria, in: Boes, D. and
Felderer, B. (eds.), The political economy of progressive taxation, Heidelberg: Springer pub-
lishing company, pp.181-211.
Simon, C. P. and A. D. Witte (1982). Beating the System - The Underground Economy. Boston:
Auburn House.
Tanzi, V. (ed.) (1982). The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad. Lexington:
Lexington Books.
Thomas, James J. (1992). Informal Economic Activity. London: Wheatsheaf.
United Nations (1993). Inventory of National Practices in Estimating Hidden and Informal Eco-
nomic Activities for National Accounts. Geneva: United Nations.
Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore; Werner W. Pommerehne and Bruno S. Frey (1984). Schatten-
wirtschaft. München: Vahlen.13
Table 1: Size of the underground economy relative to GNP in various European countries, mid























Source: Compiled from Schneider and Enste (1998).14
Table 2: Size of the underground economy relative to GNP in various developing and transition
























































Source: Compiled from Schneider and Enste (1998).16
Table 3: Growth of the underground economy relative to GNP for selected West European
countries and the United States, 1960-1995. Estimates based on the currency demand
approach (rounded figures).
1960 1995 Percentage point increase
Sweden 2% 16% 16,5%
Denmark 4,5% 17,5% 13,0%
Norway 1,5% 18,0% 16,5%
Germany 2% 13,2% 11,2%
United States 3,5% 9,5% 6%
Austria 0,5% 7% 6,5%
Switzerland 1% 6,7% 5,7%
Source: Compiled from Schneider and Enste (1998).